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CURRENT DECISIONS
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-JUSTIFICATION-OFFICER SERVING WARRANT FOR MIS-
DEMEANoR.-The defendant, a peace officer, was attempting to arrest the prose-
cuting witness under a warrant which charged him with a misdemeanor. When
the latter resisted with a knife, the defendant shot and wounded him, although
there was a clear avenue for retreat by defendant. Held, that it was error tocharge that the defendant was guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon. State
v. Dunning (1919, N. C.) 98 S. E. 530.
The court reasoned that the officer was under a "duty" to execute the warrant;
that he had a privilege to kill if necessary to perform this "duty" whether the
offense charged in the warrant was a felony or a misdemeanor. This is in accord
with the English rule. I Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1778) 481; I East, Pleas of
the Crown (1806) 307; Commonwealth v. Marcum (19o9) 135 Ky. I, 122 S. W.215. But in the United States the weight of authority is contra. People v.
Wilson (1918, Calif.) 172 Pac. 1116; Robertson v. Territory (i91O) 13 Ariz.
1o, io8 Pac. 217.
BILLS AND NOTEs-SALE-ENDORSEMENT WITHOUT RECOURSE-WARRANTY OF
GENUINENESS.-The plaintiff brought suit against 3. S. as maker and M as
endorser of a promissory note. It was pleaded and established that J. S.'s"signature" was a forgery, and that M had endorsed to the plaintiff "without
recourse in any way." There was some question as to whether M had expressly
stated that J. S. signed the note. Appeal was taken from a judgment for the
plaintiff, against M. Held, that the judgment was correct, as, while an endorser
by express contract may relieve himself from liability for forgery of signatures
to a note transferred by him, the "general refusal to guarantee" would be
"understood as confined to the responsibility of the maker." Miller v. Stewart
(1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 565.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 102.
CITIzENSHIP-Loss BY NATURALIZATION ABROAD-FRENCH LAw.-A was born
at Rio Janeiro in 1891 of a native French father, born 1856, who had obtained
American naturalization in 1878 and Brazilian naturalization in 1889. A was
claimed for military service in France, as a Frenchman. He brought an action
to obtain his release. Held, that having been born of a father who had lost his
French nationality, the plaintiff was not French. Heymann v. Minist~relde la
Guerre (1918) Tribunal civil de la Seine (1919) 46 Clunet, 32o.
This recognition of American naturalization operating as a loss of French
nationality constitutes a change in the French law. France has no naturaliza-
tion treaty with the United States. She has heretofore taken the position that
renunciation of French nationality, without governmental consent, particularly
between the ages of 17 and 40, is not permissible. See State Department
Circular of Feb. IO, 1914, and Mr. Vignaud's report to Mr. Sherman, Secretary
of State, Aug. 2, 1897, For. Rel. 1897, 141. See also cases of Emile Robin, For.
Rel. igol, 156; and of Reng Dubuc, For. Rel. I9IO, 514. The change of view is
to be commended.
CITIZENSHIP-MARRIED WOMEN-WHEN NATIVE NATIONALITY NOT LOST BY
MARRIAGE To ALIEN.-A French woman married a Turkish subject. By Turkish
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law she did not acquire Turkish nationality. By French law, "a French woman
marrying an alien follows the nationality of her husband, unless her marriage
does not confer upon her the nationality of her husband," in which case she
remains French. Held, that the woman remained French. Kaaki v. Pr6fet de
police (July 18, 1918) Tribunal civil de la Seine (1919) 46 Clunet. 322.
In a similar situation an American woman would find herself in a difficult
case, for sec. 3 of the law of March 2, 19o7 imposes the husband's nationality
upon her without the desirable French limitation that she acquire his nationality
according to his national law. The French limitation is also found in the law
of Mexico, Act of May 28, I886, art. 2, sec. 4; Belgium, Act of June 8, 19o9,
art. II. 102 St. Pap. 182; Italy, Civil Code, art. 14; Portugal, Civil Code, art.
22, sec. 4; Costa Rica, law of Dec. 21, i886, art. 4, sec. 5; Venezuela, Civil
Code, art. 19. Inasmuch as certain countries, such as Brazil, do not confer
the husband's nationality on his alien wife, an American woman marrying such
an alien would find herself endowed with her husband's nationality in the
United States but not in her husband's country or else without any nationality.
The Act of March 2, 1907, should be amended so as to embody the limitation
of the French statute and similar statutes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCEsS-AMENDMENT OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
AFTER LIMITATION PERIOD HAS EXPIRED.-A suit upon a contract of indemnity
was brought in a federal court in 19o4, and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
in 1912, judgment being affirmed on appeal in 1915. In 191o, but after the limita-
tion period had passed, suit on the same cause was commenced in the state court.
In 1913, 1915 and 1917 the Connecticut legislature passed amendments to the
limitation statute, so that under the last amendment (and possibly under the
others). suit might be brought in the state court within one year after dismissal
for jurisdictional defects of a suit upon the same cause brought in the federal
court. It was conceded that the amendment was intended to apply to the suit
brought in 19IO. Held, that the amendment did not violate the due process clause
of the federal constitution since the statute affected only the remedy in the case
of a contract unlike the case of real or personal property, where title vested upon
the expiration of the limitation period. Gilbert v. Selleck (1919, Conn.) io6
At. 439.
See COM MENTS, supra, p. 91.
CORPORATIONS-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOR TORT-GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION.-The defendant city maintained a large wooden box on the street as a
receptacle for trash and waste paper. The employee of the city who collected
the contents of the box left the lid open and thrown back, extending about one
foot over the sidewalk. The plaintiff, walking on the street, was struck in the
eye. Held, that the city was liable. Savannah v. Jones (1919, Ga.) 99 S. E. 294.
In this case, the act negligently performed was in the interest of the public
health, a governmental function. The city was held to be under a duty to keep
the lid in its proper place and was liable for injuries resulting from a breach
of this duty. For a discussion of a similar duty with respect to obstructions in
the street, see supra, p. 117.
CORPORATIONS-PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-PURCHASE OF ITS OWN STOCK.-A bill
was filed in equity by interveners claiming priority over the bondholders of an
insolvent corporation. The bonds in question were issued to pay for the cor-
poration's own stock which it had taken up. The mortgage security for the
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bonds recited the condition on which -they were issued and was recorded before
the interveners became creditors of the corporation. Held. that the interveners
were creditors with notice and could not claim priority over the bondholders.
First Trust Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1919, C. C. A. 8th) 256 Fed. 83o.
This decision conforms to the American rule that corporations have the implied
power to acquire their own stock in good faith and without injury to creditors
or minority stock holders. See an illuminating article discussing both the
American doctrine and the English rule which is contra. (1915) 24 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 177.
CORPORATIONS-PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-REINSTATEMENT AFTER FORFEITURE-
LIABILITY OF DIPECTOR.-A New Jersey corporation failed to pay a certain tax
for two successive years and in accordance with a state statute the Governor
proclaimed that it had forfeited all powers conferred upon it by law. The cor-
poration continued to do business and purported to enter into a contract with
the plaintiff. The Governor later reinstated the corporation tinder authority of
another statute. The plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants, directors of the
corporation, personally liable on the contract made during the interim between
proclamations of forfeiture and reinstatement. They contended that the cor-
poration was not existent during this time. Held (Rogers, J. dissenting), that
the corporation was at least de facto during the period before reinstatement, as
otherwise the act of the Governor would have been an attempt to create a new
corporation, which was beyond the intent and power of the legislature. Held v.
Crosthwaite (C. C. A. 2d) Oct. Term, 1918, July, 1919.
For a discussion of this case and the principles involved in which conclusions
are reached in accord with the majority of the court, see (iig) 28 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 604.
CRIMINAL LAw-NEw TRIAL-DISORDER AND EXCiTEMENT.-The accused, a
negro, was on trial for rape. Before the conclusion of the trial, while he was
being taken from the courthouse to jail, a large and menacing crowd attempted
to capture him and during the night renewed their efforts by attacking the
jail. Prompted by fear and the immediate danger of being lynched, the, accused
escaped and was not captured until two days later. Although court was
adjourned in the interim, the jury were kept together and the trial was resumed
upon the re-arrest. It was deemed necessary to guard the courthouse with state
militia and several hundred volunteer deputy sheriffs, through a picket line of
whom the jury passed upon entering and leaving the court-room. The refusal
of the trial court to grant the motion of counsel for the accused for a continuance
was assigned as error. Held, that the refusal of the court to grant the motion
constituted an abuse of discretion, as the facts disclosed an atmosphere and
environment incompatible with the right to a fair and impartial trial. Fountain
v. State (I919, Md.) 107 Atl. 554.
The decision is certainly sound in principle and serves to strengthen one's
faith in law administered by courts unshaken by public clamor. People v.
Fleming (1913) 166 Calif. 357, 136 Pac. 291; Capps v. State (1913) lop Ark.
193, 159 S. W. 193; State v. Weldon (1912) 91 S. C. 29, 74 S. E. 43. Unhappily,
a ready recognition of the true principle does not always betoken the correct
result. Cf. Frank v. State (1914) x42 Ga. 741, 83 S. E. 645.
DAMAGES--"DUTY" TO MITIGATE.-The plaintiff sold flour to the defendant,
a baker. The defendant found the flour to be bad, but used it to supply the daily
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demand for his bread. In an action by the plaintiff for the price of the flour,
the defendant counterclaimed for loss of business due to the inferior quality
of the bread. Held, that when the defendant discovered that the flour was bad,
he was under a duty not to so use it as to increase his damages and, therefore,
he could not recover on his counterclaim. Saxony Mills v,. Huck (igig, Mo. St.
L. App.) 2o8 S. W. 868.
The decision in the principal case would be disputed nowhere. 2 Sedgwick,
Damages (9th ed. 1912) sec. 764; I Sutherland, Damages (4th ed. 1916) sec.
88; 13 Cyc. 71. But it is believed that the court misnamed the legal relation
which barred recovery on the counterclaim. The court termed it a duty to
mitigate damages. If there were such a duty, the defendant would not only fail
in his counterclaim but would himself be liable to an action for damages. The
failure of the counterclaim rests rather upon the legal disability of the defendant
to charge the plaintiff with damages which he himself might have prevented.
See (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 827.
EVIDENcE-AcQuITTAL OF PENAL CHARGE-EvIDENCE IN CIVIL AcTioN-FoaREI-
TuRE.-Under a statute which provided for the forfeiture of all vehicles used
to transport liquor, proceedings were instituted to condemn the defendant's
automobile. The defendant offered in evidence an acquittal of a penal charge
based on the same transaction. Held, that the verdict of acquittal was admissible.
Duncan v. State (1919, Ga.) 99 S. E. 612.
The peculiar characteristics of forfeiture proceedings are again illustrated.
See (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 824. An acquittal of a criminal prosecution
is not admissible in evidence by the defendant in a civil action. Coffey v. United
States (1886) ii6 U. S. 436, 443, 6 Sup. Ct. 437. But in an action to enforce
a forfeiture, where the parties and issues are identical with those in the criminal
case, such acquittal is admissible. Gelston et al. v. Hoyt (1818, U. S.) 3 Wheat.
246.
EVIDENCE-EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY-CHARACTER OF CO-CONSPIRATOR-RELE-
VANc.-The defendant was indicted with one Cowan for conspiracy. To show
that it was not probable that he would enter into a combination with such a man,
the defendant sought to establish that this co-conspirator was addicted to the
excessive use of liquor which rendered him mentally incompetent at times,
which fact was known to the defendant. Held (two judges dissenting), that
such evidence was inadmissible. State v. Taylor (i919, N. J. Ct. Err.) 107 Atl.
423.
This case deals with a point on which there is little authority. The court
placed its decision on the grounds that the character of a person cannot be
established by specific acts, and that evidence of the bad character of a co-con-
spirator is irrelevant. The first point is well settled; and in support of the
second there is authority that good character cannot be shown. Walls v. State
(89o) 125 Ind. 400, 25 N. E. 457; Omer v. Commonwealth (1894) 95 Ky.
353, 25 S. W. 594. It would seem that the decision in the principal case was
correct, otherwise the character of the co-conspirator would always be in issue,
and be of little, if any, probative value.
INSURANCE-FIRE INSURANCE-VACANCY CLAUSE-BUILDING UNOCCUPIED WHEN
POLICY ISSUED.-The plaintiff sued on a policy of fire insurance which con-
tained a provision that if the buildings became vacant and remained so for
ten days, the policy should be void. The building was vacant when the policy
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was issued and continued so until destroyed by fire, six months later. The
plaintiff contended that knowledge of the vacancy by the defendant at the time
the policy was issued constituted a waiver of the express condition. Held,
that the policy became void when the building remained vacant more than ten
days before the fire. May v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. (I919, Ga. Ct. App.)
99 S. E. 631.
The precise question involved here had not been previously answered in
Georgia, but the court did not discuss the grounds of its decision. It was
apparently held that the express condition was waived at the time of the forma-
tion of the contract but no intimation is made as to when the waiver ceased
to operate and the ten days began to run. The same court has held that viola-
tion of the "vacancy clause" merely suspends the policy during the period of
unoccupancy. Athens Mutual Insurance Co. v. Toney (1907) I Ga. App. 492,
57 S. E. 1013. This latter question is commented upon in (1917) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 320; and (1914) 23 ibid., 459.
PERSONS-MARRIAGE-UNDIVORCED LIVING WIFE-REMOVAL OF IMPEDIMENT-
PRESUMPTION.-In a proceeding to partition lands, it became necessary to
determine whether the defeindant was the widow of the intestate. It appeared
that the intestate went through the proper ceremonial form of marriage
with the defendant in igoI, although he then had a living undivorced wife.
The latter died in 1913 and the intestate continued cohabiting with the
defendant until his death in 1916. The court inferred that both defendant
and intestate knew of the living undivorced wife at the time of their attempted
marriage. Held, that the relation, having been illegal in its inception, must
be presumed to have continued so after the death of the legal wife. Thompson
v. Clay (1919, Miss.) 82 So. I.
Cohabitation which is apparently matrimonial raises a strong presumption of a
legal marriage. Reynolds v. Adams (ig, Va.) 99 S. E. 695. In reasoning
that a change from an illegal to a legal relationship requires more than mere
continuance of living together after the removal of the impediment to the mar-
riage, the court is supported by much authority, although the decisions are not
in entire accord. For the citation of cases and reasoning which is followed
in toto by the instant case, see COMMENTS (1916) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 145;
but see (1918) 27 ibid., 702.
REAL PROPERTY-OPTIONS-RIGHT OF PREhmPTION-RULE AGAINST PERPET-
UITIES-In buying a wharf from B, A covenanted for himself and his heirs,
with B his heirs and assigns, that if ever he should sell certain oyster grounds,
he would at the option of B reconvey the wharf to B for a certain sum. On
the devisee of A leasing the wharf to defendant for a term of 99 years, the
assignee of B brought suit to have the lease declared void and to have the
option enforced. Held, that the covenant was void as violating the rule against
perpetuities. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West (1919, Coln.) 1o7 Atl. 138. See
COMMENT, supra, p. 87.
TRUSTS-MERGER-BUSINESS TRUST ASSOcIATION.--The sole trustee of a real
estate trust, the equitable interest of which was represented by transferable
shares, acquired by indorsement all of the outstanding shares. Thereafter,
the real estate standing in his name as trustee was attached by his personal
creditor. Held, that by virtue of the union of the entire legal and equitable
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interests in a single ownership the equitable interest was merged in the legal
and the trust was thereby extinguished. Contingham v. Bright (1917) 228
Mass. 385, 117 N. E. gog. See COMMENT, supra, p. 97.
WILLS-CONTESTABLE INTERESTS-EXPECTANCIES.-After being assigned all
the "right, title, and interest" of the only heir of the testator, the plaintiff
brought an action to contest the probate of the will. Held, that the plaintiff has
not acquired such an interest as will give him the power to contest the will.
it re Vanden Bosch's Estate (igig, Mich.) 173 N. W. 332.
Under the early common law it was well settled that a mere expectancy was
not an assignable interest. Skipper v. Stokes (1868) 42 Ala. 255. The reason
for this rule was that a conveyance presupposes a right in being. Bayler v.
Commonwealth (186i) 4o Pa. St. 37. However equity treated all assignments of
future interests as contracts to assign in the future, and when made in good
faith enforced them. Bridge v. Kedon (1912) 163 Calif. 493, 126 Pac. i49.
In the absence of fraud there is no reason why courts of law should not treat
the liability of inheritance as an assignable interest and the assignee as a
person in interest. The weight of authority seems to be with the principal
case however. Ransome v. Bearden (1878) 5o Tex. IIg.
WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENcE-BuRDEN OF PROOF-CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP.-
The testator's daughter contested the validity of his will, claiming undue influence
by a legatee, a niece. Opportunity for the exercise of undue influence was
proven but no evidence was offered from which it could be inferred that the
legatee exercised a dominating influence over the testator. The trial judge
directed a verdict for the proponent and the contestant appealed, contending
that the proponent had the burden of disproving undue influence. Held, that
the directed verdict was proper. Downey v. Guilfoile (1919, Conn.) 107 Atl.
562.
The rule which makes proof of undue influence by a direct mode of inference
unnecessary does not relieve the contestant of a burden to establish by an
indirect mode of inference a foundation of facts which convincingly lead to the
conclusion of undue influence. This foundation is established when it has
been shown that a stranger-beneficiary has occupied the relation of religious
adviser, guardian, attorney, or physician toward the testator. In such cases,
the rule of procedure places the burden, often erroneously termed "duty,"
upon the legatee of proving absence of undue influence. Gager v. Mathewson
(1919, Conn.) 107 Atl. I. For an exposition of the probative value of such a
presumption when established and a comparison with the similar presumption
as to sanity, see COMMENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 777.
